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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
James Gerdon appeals from the district court's order summarily dismissing his 
third petition for post-conviction relief. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
The district court set forth the factual and procedural history of Gerdon's 
underlying criminal case and subsequent post-conviction relief actions as follows: 
In an underlying criminal case, State of Idaho v. James Alan [sic] 
Gerdon, Dist. Ct., Fifth Jud. Dist., Twin Falls County, Idaho, Case No. CR 
03-6576, Gerdon pied guilty on November 10, 2003, to four counts of 
Sexual Abuse of a Minor, three counts of Lewd Conduct with a Minor, and 
two counts of Attempted Lewd Conduct with a Minor. On February 13, 
2004, Gerdon was sentenced to a total of fifteen years fixed and fifteen 
years indeterminate with all sentences to run concurrent. Gerdon filed a 
notice of Appeal on March 16, 2004. However, in an unpublished 
decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence. 
State v. Gerdon, Docket No. 30624, 2005 Unpublished Opinion No. 468 
(May 19, 2005). 
On October 20, 2004, Gerdon filed his first petition for post-
conviction relief which was summarily dismissed by the Honorable John C. 
Hohnhorst, District Judge, on June 28, 2006. See James Allen Gerdon v. 
State of Idaho, Dist. Ct., Fifth Jud. Dist., Twin Falls County, Idaho, Case 
No. CV 2004-5173. On September 10, 2007, Gerdon appealed this 
dismissal; however, the Idaho Supreme Court Conditionally Dismissed 
Gerdon's appeal for failure to file the Notice of Appeal within forty-two 
days. 
On April 21, 2008, Gerdon filed his second Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief claiming ineffective assistance of counsel during his first 
post-conviction. See James Allen Gerdon v. State of Idaho, Dist. Ct., Fifth 
Jud. Dist., Twin Falls County, Idaho, Case No. CV 2008-1712. On May 6, 
2009, the district court summarily dismissed this petition stating the 
petitioner's allegations were conclusory and unsubstantiated by any fact. 
In addition, the court held that an allegation of ineffective assistance of 
counsel during post-conviction relief proceedings is not a cognizable 
ground for filing a subsequent post-conviction relief application. Although 
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Gerdon appealed the district court's Order, he subsequently filed a Motion 
to Voluntarily Dismiss Appeal on March 31, 2010. 
On June 21, 2010, Gerdon filed his third petition for post conviction 
relief with an accompanying affidavit. On April 4, 2011, the State filed its 
Motion for Summary Dismissal as to all claims in Gerdon's petition for 
post-conviction relief. On April 18, 2011, Gerdon filed a verified Amended 
Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. As a basis for relief 
Gerdon claims his prior post-conviction counsel failed to assert ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel for failure to file a motion to suppress and failing 
to object to restitution. This court first dismissed allegations regarding 
restitution and issued a notice of intent to dismiss his allegation regarding 
trial counsel's failure to file a motion to suppress.[11 Gerdon then filed a 
Motion to Reconsider and an Amended Motion for Reconsideration. The 
court heard arguments generally on August 8, 2011, however, no formal 
filing was made in response to the court's intent to dismiss Gerdon's 
allegation regarding trial counsel's failure to file a motion to suppress. 
(R., pp.312-314.) 
On September 30, 2011, the district court issued an order captioned 
"Memorandum Opinion on Petitioner's Amended Successive Petition for Post 
Conviction Relief, Motion for Reconsideration, and Amended Motion for 
Reconsideration." (R., pp.311-322.) In that order, the court denied Gerdon's motion for 
reconsideration, reaffirmed its prior determination that Gerdon's first claim was barred 
by res judicata principles fn. 1, supra), held both claims were untimely, and 
dismissed the case. (Id.) Gerdon filed a timely appeal. (R., pp.326-329.) 
1 In its Notice of Intent to Dismiss Amended Successive Petition for Post Conviction 
Relief, filed May 17, 2011, the district court gave notice of its intent to dismiss Gerdon's 
first claim on the basis that it was barred by principles of res judicata from being 
relitigated. (R., pp.211-212.) 
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ISSUE 
Gerdon states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it dismissed Mr. Gerdon's Amended 
Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief as untimely and as a 
successive petition, because the doctrine of equitable tolling should have 
applied to allow the Amended Successive Petition? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.2.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Gerdon failed to demonstrate error in the district court's summary dismissal of his 
third post-conviction petition? 
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ARGUMENT 
Gerdon Has Failed To Demonstrate Error In The District Court's Summary Dismissal Of 
His Third Post-Conviction Petition 
A Introduction 
On appeal, Gerdon challenges the district court's summary dismissal of his third 
post-conviction petition, in which he claimed his trial counsel was ineffective for failing 
to: (1) file a suppression motion alleging that, when law enforcement authorities 
executed a search warrant they "would not show [himJ a copy nor tell [him] what they 
were searching for[,}" and (2) object to an order that he pay $800.00 in restitution, 
which, he alleges, was not part of his plea agreement. (R., p.189.) Gerdon also argues 
that, although his third post-conviction petition is untimely, such untimeliness should be 
excused by equitable tolling principles because his claims were inadequately presented 
during his first post-conviction proceeding due to: (a) a lack of effective communication 
with his attorneys "at the trial stage, appellate stage, and during his post-convictions[,]" 
(b) "trouble with his legal mail," and (c) being incarcerated out-of-state without access to 
legal representation and Idaho legal materials. (Appellant's Brief, pp.5-6.) Gerdon's 
arguments lack merit. 
As the district court correctly concluded, because Gerdon's first claim was 
presented and denied in his first post-conviction proceeding, it is precluded from being 
reasserted under the res judicata doctrine. Moreover, the untimeliness of Gerdon's two 
claims is not excused by the equitable tolling doctrine or by a "sufficient reason" under 
I.C. § 19-4908 2 inasmuch as he was aware of the factual basis of both claims no later 
2 Successive post-conviction petitions are generally barred under I.C. § 19-4908, which 
states: 
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than August 15, 2006, and failed to file them until he filed his third post-conviction 
petition on June 21, 2010 -- which was not a reasonable time thereafter. 
B. Standard Of Review 
In reviewing the summary dismissal of a post-conviction application, the 
appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact exists 
which, if resolved in petitioner's favor, would require relief to be granted. Nellsch v. 
State, 122 Idaho 426, 434, 835 P.2d 661, 669 (Ct. App. 1992). The court freely reviews 
the district court's application of the law. kl However, the court is not required to 
accept either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible 
evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law. Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 
P.3d 110,112 (2001). 
C. Gerdon Has Failed To Demonstrate Any Error In The District Court's 
Determination That His First Claim Is Barred By The Doctrine Of Res Judicata 
Gerdon's first claim in his third post-conviction petition is that his trial counsel 
was ineffective for failing to file a suppression motion on the basis that service of the 
search warrant was improper. (R., p.189.) He more specifically claims: 
Waiver of or failure to assert claims. -- All grounds for relief 
available to an applicant under this act must be raised in his original, 
supplemental or amended application. Any ground finally adjudicated or 
not so raised, or knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived in the 
proceeding that resulted in the conviction or sentence or in any other 
proceeding the applicant has taken to secure relief may not be the basis 
for a subsequent application, unless the court finds a ground for relief 
asserted which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately 
raised in the original, supplemental, or amended application. 
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I asked for a search warrant and when the authorities undertook the 
search and would not show me a copy nor tell me what they were 
searching for. I did ask these questions of the authorities. 
(Id.) However, the district court correctly determined that, because Gerdon 
unsuccessfully presented that same claim in his first post-conviction petition, it was 
barred under the doctrine of res judicata from being raised again. The district court's 
Notice of Intent to Dismiss Amended Successive Petition for Post Conviction Relief 
initially explained its res judicata ground for dismissing Gerdon's suppression claim in 
the following way: 
Gerdon asserts that his prior post-conviction counsel failed or 
improperly raised the issue of ineffective assistance by trial counsel in not 
filing a motion to suppress regarding improper service of a search warrant. 
However, the issue regarding the failure to file a motion to suppress was 
raised and ruled upon in Gerdon's first petition for post-conviction relief. 
See James Allen Gerdon v. State of Idaho, Dist. Ct., Fifth Jud. Dist., Twin 
Falls County, Idaho, Case No. CV 2004-5173 NOTICE OF INTENT TO 
DISMISS 060 0211 (the relevant portion of that opinion is attached for 
reference and incorporated herein as if fully set forth). As such, that ruling 
is res judicata as to the claim now asserted by Gerdon. 
(R., pp.211-212.) 
After the evidentiary hearing on Gerdon's motion for reconsideration, the district 
court issued a memorandum opinion and reiterated: 
Gerdon's Amended Successive Petition asserts that his prior post-
conviction counsel failed or improperly raised the issue of ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel for not filing a motion to suppress regarding 
improper service of a search warrant. However, this issue has previously 
been raised and ruled upon in Gerdon's first petition for post-conviction 
relief. See James Allen Gerdon v. Stat~ of Idaho, Dist. Ct., Fifth Jud. 
Dist., Twin Falls County, Idaho, Case No. CV 2004-5173 (the relevant 
portion of that opinion is attached to this court's Notice of Intent to 
Dismiss, filed May 17, 2011). 
(R., p.318.) 
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A review of the relevant portion of the opinion of Gerdon's first post-conviction 
case, Twin Falls District Court Case No. CV 2004-5173, shows his claim that his trial 
attorney was ineffective for failing to file a suppression motion to challenge the validity 
of the service of the search warrant was both raised and rejected in that earlier 
proceeding, to wit: 
Gerdon claims he was present during the search, and asked the 
officers executing the search for a copy of the warrant. According to 
Gerdon, the officers refused to give him a copy. Second Aff., p.3, ~ 3(4). 
The Search Warrant issued by Judge Higer in the underlying criminal case 
stated: 
A COPY OF THE WARRANT AND A RECEIPT FOR THE 
PROPERTY TAKEN SHALL BE GIVEN TO THE PERSON 
FROM WHOM OR FROM WHOSE PREMISES PROPERTY 
IS TAKEN. IF NO PERSON IS FOUND IN POSSESSION, A 
COPY AND RECEIPT SHALL BE CONSPICUOUSLY 
POSTED AT THE PLACE WHERE THE PROPERTY IS 
FOUND. 
Sup. Pet., Exh. A. 
Officer Smith, who was in charge of conducting the search, averred 
in the Inventory and Return of Search Warrant that "On the 8th day of 
July, 2003, I made a diligent search of the above-described premises, 
vehicle, or person and found and seized the items listed below in Item 7.'' 
Sup. Pet., Exh. B (Inventory). The Inventory further recited: 
3. Name(s) of person(s) found in possession of property: 
NIA. 
4. The inventory was made in the presence of: 
[ ] The person(s) named in (3) from whose possession the 
property was taken. 
[ X] Others: Det. Scott Smith; Det. Curt Gambrel; Det. Chris 
Fullmer; Det. Chuck Garner; Det. Luke Allen; Officer Clint 
Doerr; CSO Tracy Perreira; CSO Patti Rohweder 
5. Name of person served with a copy or description of 
place where copy is posted; A copy was left on the couch 
in the living room at the residence. 
Sup. Pet., Exh. B (emphasis by district court). 
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There is an obvious discrepancy between Gerdon's claim that he 
was present during the search, and those identified by the Inventory as 
being present. Other than his unverified assertion, Gerdon has given the 
Court no evidence to support his claim that he was present during the 
search, or that the officers conducting the search did not serve a copy of 
the warrant upon him. The Idaho Supreme Court has specifically held that 
a search warrant need not be presented before a search is conducted. 
In State v. Gomez, 101 Idaho 802,809,623 P.2d 110 (1980), cert. 
denied, 454 U.S. 963, 102 S.Ct. 503, 70 LEd.2d 378 (1981) the court 
found the following statement from the United States Supreme Court to be 
applicable to search warrants issued pursuant to I.C.R. 41: "[Federal] 
Rule 41 (d) does require federal officers to serve upon the person 
searched a copy of the warrant and a receipt describing the material 
obtained, but it does not invariably require that this be done before the 
search takes place." Gomez, 101 Idaho at 809 (quoting Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 355 n.16, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 LEd.2d 576 (1967)). 
The court also noted that other courts have concluded that the fact that 
investigative officers initiated a search without the issued but undelivered 
warrant in their physical possession did not invalidate the search. Gomez, 
101 Idaho at 809 (citing United States v. Woodring, 444 F.2d 749 (9th 
Cir.1971); United States v. Cooper, 421 F.Supp. 804 0/V.D. Tenn. 1976); 
State v. Johnson, 16 Ohio Misc. 278, 240 N.E.2d 574 (Ct. C.P. 1968)). 
Gerdon does not assert that he never received a copy of the warrant. 
Even if Gerdon was present at the time of the search, and even if 
the officers failed to serve him with a copy of the warrant, his claim that 
this should invalidate the search is unavailing. 
Gerdon has failed to show that his attorney's inaction was deficient 
in any way, or that he has been prejudiced thereby. Gerdon's claims 
concerning his attorney's failure to file a motion to suppress are dismissed. 
(R., pp.220-222.) 
Gerdon's first claim of his third post-conviction petition is identical to the claim 
decided by the district court in Gerdon's first post-conviction proceeding - the alleged 
failure of trial counsel to file a suppression motion based on improper service of the 
search warrant. Therefore, that claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata, which 
prevents re-litigation of issues that have been previously decided in a final judgment or 
decision in an action between the same litigants. State v. Rhoades, 134 Idaho 862, 
8 
863, 11 P.3d 481,482 (2000); Gublerv. Brydon, 125 Idaho 107,110,867 P.2d 981,984 
(1994). The district court's order summarily dismissing Gerdon's first claim of his third 
post-conviction petition was proper, and Gerdon has failed to meet his burden on 
appeal of demonstrating otherwise. 
D. Gerdon Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing 
His Third Post-Conviction Petition Based On Untimeliness 
1. Introduction 
On February 17, 2004, the Judgment of Conviction in Gerdon's underlying 
criminal case was entered, and following an unsuccessful appeal, the Remittitur was 
filed on July 5, 2005. (R., p.85.) Pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-4902, Gerdon had one 
year from the expiration of that date to present his current post-conviction claims -- July 
5, 2006. 
Gerdon timely filed his first post-conviction petition on October 20, 2004, before 
his direct appeal was final, but it was summarily dismissed on June 28, 2006, and 
because he did not appeal that dismissal order within 42 days, but instead waited until 
September 10, 2007 to do so, the Idaho Supreme Court conditionally dismissed the 
appeal as untimely on October 11, 2007. 3 (R., pp.85, 312-314.) 
On April 21, 2008, Gerdon filed a second post-conviction petition (R., p.85), 
which was summarily dismissed on May 6, 2009 (R., pp.86, 313). Although Gerdon 
3 According to a brief filed by the state, the Idaho Supreme Court gave Gerdon 21 days 
to respond to its notice, but Gerdon appears to have filed a Motion for 
Reconsideration/Motion for Re-ruling in the district court instead. (See R., p.282.) The 
record on appeal does not include the Remittitur for Gerdon's first post-conviction 
proceeding. 
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appealed that dismissal order, he later filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss the appeal, 
which motion was granted along with the filing of a Remittitur on April 5, 2010 (id.). 
Gerdon filed his third post-conviction petition on June 21, 2010, which was 
summarily dismissed on September 30, 2011. (R., pp.86, 311-322.) In this appeal of 
that dismissal, Gerdon asserts that, although his third post-conviction petition is 
untimely, such untimeliness should be excused by equitable tolling principles because 
his claims were inadequately presented (re: suppression based on improper service) or 
not raised (re: restitution) during his first post-conviction proceeding due to a lack of 
effective communication with his attorneys, trouble with his legal mail, and because he 
was incarcerated out-of-state he was denied access to legal representation and Idaho 
legal materials. (Appellant's Brief, pp.5-6.) Gerdon's arguments fail. 
2. Both The Due Process Clause And Equitable Tolling Require Inmates To 
Show They Were Actually Hindered Or Prevented From Filing A Petition 
Clarifying its opinion in Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977), that legal 
resources may be necessary to provide inmates with access to the courts, the United 
States Supreme Court stated in Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996): 
Because Bounds did not create an abstract, freestanding right to a law 
library or legal assistance, an inmate cannot establish relevant actual 
injury simply by establishing that his prison's law library or legal assistance 
program is subpar in some theoretical sense. That would be the precise 
analog of the healthy inmate claiming constitutional violation because of 
the inadequacy of the prison infirmary. Insofar as the right vindicated by 
Bounds is concerned, "meaningful access to the courts is the touchstone," 
id., at 823, 97 S.Ct., at 1'495 (internal quotation marks omitted), and the 
inmate therefore must go one step further and demonstrate that the 
alleged shortcomings in the library or legal assistance program hindered 
his efforts to pursue a legal claim. 
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Thus, Lewis explains, an inmate is required to show "actual injury" by going "one step 
further and demonstrat[ing] that the alleged shortcomings in the library or legal 
assistance program hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim." ~ Therefore, the due 
process test for meaningful access to courts is not simply premised on whether an 
inmate has access to law books or legal assistance. Rather, the inmate must establish 
in his petition a causal connection: that the alleged inadequacies of available legal 
resources actually hindered or prevented him from pursuing a legal claim. 
Under Idaho law, the rule for "tolling" the statute of limitation for a UPCPA 
petition is effectively the same as the Due Process standard -- the shortcoming must 
actually hinder or prevent the filing of the petition. Idaho Code § 19-4902 provides, "An 
application may be filed at any time within one (1) year from the expiration of the time 
for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from the determination of a 
proceeding following an appeal, whichever is later." The failure to file a timely petition 
for post-conviction relief is a basis for dismissal of the petition. Evensiosky v. State, 136 
Idaho 189, 190-191, 30 P.2d 967, 968-969 (2001). 
Generally, "equitable tolling" is available only where the petitioner shows that 
"extraordinary circumstances prevented him from filing his petition on time." Valverde v. 
Stinson, 224 F.3d 129, 133 (2nd Cir. 2000) (discussing equitable tolling theories in the 
context of federal habeas petitions); see Chico-Rodriguez v. State, 141 Idaho 579, 582, 
114 P.3d 137, 140 (Ct App. 2005) (discussing "extraordinary circumstances" and 
acknowledging "the bar for equitable tolling for post-conviction actions is high"). Idaho 
appellate courts have recognized that the one-year limitation period of I.C. § 19-4902 
may be tolled if an applicant is prevented, either by mental disease or by being denied 
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access to courts, from earlier pursuing challenges to his or her conviction. Sayas v. 
State, 139 Idaho 957, 960, 88 P.3d 776, 779 (Ct. App. 2003); Anderson v. State, 133 
Idaho 788, 791, 992 P.2d 783, 786 (Ct. App. 1999). However, a petitioner seeking 
equitable tolling must demonstrate a causal connection between the "extraordinary 
circumstance" and failure to timely file a petition. The Idaho Court of Appeals explained 
in Chico-Rodriguez v. State, 141 Idaho 579, 582, 114 P.3d 137, 140 (Ct. App. 2005): 
We hold that in order for the statute of limitation under the UPCPA to be 
tolled on account of a mental illness, an unrepresented petitioner must 
show that he suffered from a serious mental illness which rendered him 
incompetent to understand his legal right to bring an action within a year 
or otherwise rendered him incapable of taking necessary steps to pursue 
that right uitable tolling will apply only during the period in which the 
petitioner's mental illness actually prevented him from filing a post-
conviction action; any period following conviction during which the 
petitioner fails to meet the equitable tolling criteria will count toward the 
limitation period. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Thus, as is true in regard to the Due Process Clause, Idaho's post-conviction 
relief statute of limitation also requires inmates to show they have actually been 
prevented or hindered from filing a petition by whatever shortcoming or interference has 
been alleged. 
3. The District Court Correctly Determined That Gerdon Failed To 
Demonstrate A Sufficient Reason For The Untimely Filing Of His Claims 
Where, as here, an initial post-conviction action was timely filed and has been 
concluded, an inmate may file a subsequent application outside of the one-year 
limitation period if the court finds a ground for relief asserted which for sufficient reason 
was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the original, supplemental, or amended 
application. I.C. § 19-4908; Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 904, 174 P.3d 870, 
12 
874 (2007). Moreover, newly discovered claims must be filed within a reasonable time 
after their discovery under Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 904, 174 P.3d at 874. 
As previously discussed, because Gerdon fully presented his first claim -- trial 
counsel's failure to file a suppression motion based on improper service of the search 
warrant -- in ~1is first post-conviction proceeding, he is precluded from reasserting that 
claim by the doctrine of res judicata. Gerdon's second claim - that his plea agreement 
was breached by the court ordering $800 in restitution - is clearly untimely from his July 
5, 2006 post-conviction filing deadline because he was made aware during his 
sentencing hearing that the state was going to present such an order for the court to 
sign.4 (R., p.46 (prosecutor advised court during sentencing hearing that the state 
would be presenting an order to the court for $800 for payment for an evaluation of 
Gerdon that was ordered by the court); see also R., p.32 (restitution order).) 
4 With regard to Gerdon's restitution claim, the record shows that a Restitution Order for 
payment of $800.00 was entered on February 18, 2004, five days after Gerdon was 
sentenced and one day after the Judgment of Conviction and Sentence was filed. (R., 
pp.30-32.) The district court's first Notice of Intent to Dismiss, filed prior to Gerdon 
amending his third post-conviction petition, stated: 
Gerdon also asserts that his due process rights were violated when 
Judge Hohnhorst signed an Order of Restitution outside the presence of 
him and his counsel. The state informed the court at sentencing, in 
Gerdon's presence, that it would submit an order of restitution for the 
psychosexual evaluation which Gerdon undertook. Gerdon was thus 
aware of this order at sentencing and had the opportunity to object 
through counsel. These opportunities provided Gerdon with due process 
as a matter of law and this claim is not supportable now. 
Finally, the Order of Restitution was public record. Gerdon has 
failed to provide a sufficient reason why he did not know or could not have 
known, after due diligence, that restitution had been entered against him. 
As such, his claim should be summarily dismissed. 
(R., p.96.) 
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Nevertheless, the district court gave Gerdon the benefit of any doubt by placing 
the outside date that he had knowledge of the factual bases for his claims as August 15, 
2006, the day Gerdon sent the court a letter acknowledging he had lost his first post-
conviction case and was going to appeal.5 Therefore, whether measured from August 
15, 2006 to when Gerdon filed his second post-conviction petition on April 21, 2008 
(over one year and eight months) as the district court did6, or to when Gerdon actually 
filed his claims in his third post-conviction petition (over three years and ten months), 
Gerdon's claims are clearly untimely because they were not filed within a reasonable 
time from when he became aware of them. Moreover, Gerdon cannot fault any attorney 
for his failure to file a timely petition in the twenty month period after August 15, 2006, 
5 The district court explained the significance of the August 15, 2006 letter as follows: 
Gerdon's first post-conviction relief action was dismissed on June 
28, 2006. A month later, Gerdon expressed concern about the status of 
his case and Judge Hohnhorst mailed a copy of the June 28, 2006 
Memorandum Opinion to Gerdon. Gerdon sent a letter, postmarked 
August 15, 2006, requesting an affidavit from Judge Hohnhorst for 
purposes of an appeal. Gerdon then filed an appeal on September 10, 
2007. The appeal was dismissed for failure to file within forty-two days. 
Gerdon then filed his second post-conviction relief action on April 21, 
2008. 
(R., p.318.) 
6 It should be noted that, although Gerdon did not file his two current claims in his 
second post-conviction petition, the court gave him the benefit of measuring the relevant 
filing deadline to the filing date of that petition instead of the petition that actually 
contained his claims - the third petition which was filed on June 21, 2010. 
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because he did not have one until the time he filed his second petition on April 31, 
2008.7 
The district court summarily dismissed Gerdon's third post-conviction petition, 
reasoning that, despite his equitable estoppel claim, he should have filed his two claims 
in a timely petition, i.e., within a reasonable time after August 15, 2006, because (1) he 
had filed two post-conviction petitions on his own in the past ( one stemming from a 
different underlying criminal matter) and clearly knew how to do so, (2) he was not 
denied access to the courts, and (3) he knew about the factual basis for both of his 
claims no later than August 15, 2006. (R., p.96; 318-321; see n.4, supra.) Gerdon did 
not file his current claims in his second post-conviction petition, which was filed on April 
21, 2008. Even if he had, as the district court found, that eighteen-month delay8 was 
not a reasonable time period for filing newly discovered claims under Charboneau, 144 
Idaho at 904, 174 P.3d at 874. (R., pp.317-321.) Further, Gerdon filed his two claims 
on June 21, 2010, which is all the more untimely from August 15, 2006, the date Gerdon 
is deemed to have known about them. 
The district court explained: 
Simply put, Gerdon was not deprived of court access, being very familiar 
with the process of filing post-conviction relief claims, and was well aware 
of the arguments he wanted to assert in a subsequent post-conviction 
relief action when his first post-conviction relief action was dismissed. 
Therefore, Gerdon's eighteen month delay [after August 15, 2006] in filing 
a subsequent post-conviction relief action is unreasonable. 
7 According to Gerdon's testimony at the "evidentiary" hearing, he was assigned an 
attorney after he filed his second post-conviction petition in April of 2008. (Tr.: p.174, 
L.12-22.) 
8 More accurately, it is just over twenty months between August 15, 2006 and April 21, 
2008. 
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Based on the untimeliness of Gerdon's second post-conviction 
relief action, his third post-conviction relief action is also untimely, and 
must be dismissed, regardless of the alleged ineffective assistance of 
counsel for his first post-conviction relief claim. 
(R., pp.320-321.) 
In sum, even accepting Gerdon's allegation that his first post-conviction counsel 
was negligent in presenting his claims, Gerdon has not presented a sufficient reason 
under I.C. § 19-4908 to justify his failure to present his claims within a reasonable time 
from August 15, 2006. The district court's summary dismissal order, attached as 
Appendix A, and incorporated into this brief as if fully set forth herein, is fully relied upon 
in support of the state's argument that Gerdon's third post-conviction petition is 
untimely, and summary dismissal is warranted on that basis. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court's order 
summarily dismissing Gerdon's third post-conviction petition. 
DATED this 15th day of October, 2012. 
~ JOfj,Jf4 C. McKINNEY V 
De({uty Attorney General 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
JAMES ALLEN GERDON, ) 
) Case No. CV 2010-2884 
Petitioner, ) 
) 
vs. ) MEMORANDUM OPINION ON 
) PETITIONER'S AMENDED 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) SUCCESSIVE PETITION FOR 
) POST CONVICTION RELIEF, 
Respondent. ) MOTION FOR 
) RECONSIDERATION, AND 
) AMENDED MOTION FOR 
) RECONSIDERATION 
THIS MA TIER is before the court after evidence and oral arguments were 
presented on August 8, 2011. The State of Idaho ("State") was represented at the 
hearing by Julie Sturgill, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Twin Falls County. 
James Allen Gerdon ("Gerdon") presented prose, with Tim Williams acting as 
standby counsel. 




The court, on the basis of the application and record before it, is satisfied 
that Gerdon is not entitled to post:-conviction relief and no purpose would be 
served by any further proceedings. His Amended Successive Petition is 
therefore DISMISSED with prejudice. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In an underlying criminal case, State of Idaho v. James Alan [sic] Gerdon, 
Dist. Ct., Fifth Jud. Dist., Twin Falls County, Idaho, Case No. CR 03-6576, Gerdon 
pled guilty on November 10, 2003, to four counts of Sexual Abuse of a Minor, 
three counts of Lewd Conduct with a Minor, and two counts of Attempted Lewd 
Conduct with a Minor. On February 13, 2004, Gerdon was sentenced to a total of 
fifteen years fixed and fifteen years indeterminate with all sentences to run 
concurrent. Gerdon filed a notice of Appeal on March 16, 2004. However, in an 
unpublished decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and 
sentence. State v. Gerdon, Docket No. 30624, 2005 Unpublished Opinion No. 468 
(May 19, 2005). 
On October 20, 2004, Gerdon filed his first petition for post-conviction 
relief which was summarily dismissed by the Honorable John Hohnhorst, 
District Judge, on June 28, 2006. See James Allen Gerdon v. State of Idaho, Dist. Ct, 
Fifth Jud. Dist., Twin Falls County, Idaho, Case No. CV 2004-5173. On 
September 10, 2007, Gerdon appealed this dismissal; however, the Idaho 
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Supreme Court Conditionally Dismissed Gerdon' s appeal for failure to file the 
Notice of Appeal within forty-two days. 
On April 21, 2008, Gerdon filed his second Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief claiming ineffective assistance of counsel during his first post-conviction. 
See James Allen Gerdon v. State of Idaho, Dist. Ct., Fifth Jud. Dist., Twin Falls 
County, Idaho, Case No. CV 2008-1712. On May 6, 2009, the district court 
summarily dismissed this petition stating the petitioner's allegations were 
conclusory and unsubstantiated by any fact. In addition, the court held that an 
allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel during post-conviction relief 
proceedings is not a cognizable ground for filing a subsequent post-conviction 
relief application. Although Gerdon appealed the district court's Order, he 
subsequently filed a Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss Appeal on March 31, 2010. 
On June 21, 2010, Gerdon filed his third petition for post conviction relief 
with an accompanying affidavit. On April 4, 2011, the State filed its Motion for 
Summary Dismissal as to all claims in Gerdon's petition for post-conviction 
relief. On April 18, 2011, Gerdon filed a verified Amended Successive Petition 
for Post-Conviction Relief. As a basis for relief Ger don claims his prior post-
conviction counsel failed to assert ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure 
to file a motion to suppress and failing to object to restitution. This court first 
dismissed allegations regarding restitution and issued a notice of intent to 
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dismiss his allegation regarding trial counsel's failure to file a motion to 
suppress. Gerdon then filed a Motion to Reconsider and an Amended Motion for 
Reconsideration. The court heard arguments generally on August 8, 2011, 
however, no formal filing was made in response to the court's intent to dismiss 
Gerdon's allegation regarding trial counsel's failure to file a motion to suppress. 
For the reasons stated below, the court dismisses Gerdon' s Amended Successive 
Petition and denies Gerdon' s Motion for Reconsideration and Amended Motion 
for Reconsideration. 
APPLICABLE LAW 
An application for post-conviction relief under the UPCP A initiates a 
proceeding which is civil in nature. Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490, 495, 36 P.3d 
1278, 1282 (2001). Like the plaintiff in any other civil proceeding, an applicant 
must substantiate, by a preponderance of evidence, the allegations upon which 
his or her request for post-conviction relief is based. Idaho Code § 19-4907; Grube 
v. State, 134 Idaho 24, 27, 995 P.2d 794, 797 (2000). Unlike a complaint in a civil 
action, however, an application for post-conviction relief must contain much 
more than ''a short and plain statement of the claim" that would suffice for a 
complaint under LR.C.P. S(a)(l). Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813, 816, 892 P.2d 
488, 491 (Ct. App. 1995). Rather, an application for post-conviction relief must be 






§ 19-4903. The application must include affidavits, records, or other evidence 
supporting its allegations, or must state why such supporting evidence is not 
included. Id. Further, the post-conviction petitioner must make factual 
allegations showing each essential element of the claim, and a showing of 
admissible evidence must be proffered to support those factual allegations. 
Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644,647,873 P.2d 898,901 (Ct. App. 1994). 
Idaho Code Section 19-4906(c) authorizes summary disposition of an 
application for post-conviction relief. Summary dismissal of an application 
pursuant to LC.§ 19-4906 is the procedural equivalent of summary judgment 
under LR.C.P. 56. Judd v. State, 148 Idaho 22,218 P.3d 1 (Ct. App. 2009). LC.§ 19-
4906(c) provides: 
The court may grant a motion by either party for 
summary disposition of the application when it 
appears from the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of 
fact, together with any affidavits submitted, that there 
is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
When the alleged facts, even if true, would not entitle the applicant to relief, the 
trial court may dismiss the application without holding an evidentiary hearing. 
Cooper v. State, 96 Idaho 542,545,531 P.2d 1187, 1190 (1975). Allegations 
contained in the application are insufficient for the granting of relief when (1) 




they are clearly disproved by the record of the original proceedings, or (2) they 
do not justify relief as a matter of law. Id. 
The statute of limitations for post-conviction actions begins to "run from 
the expiration of the time for [an] appeal in the criminal action." The time is not 
restarted by filing an untimely appeal. Loman v. State, 138 Idaho 1, 2, 56 P.3d 158, 
159 (Ct. A pp. 2002). If an initial post-conviction action was timely filed and has 
been concluded, an inmate may file a subsequent application outside of the one-
year limitation period if the court finds a ground for relief asserted which for 
sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the original, 
supplemental, or amended application. LC.§ 19-4908. Charboneau v. State, 144 
Idaho 900, 904, 174 P.3d 870, 874 (2007) (emphasis added). The failure to file a 
timely application is a basis for dismissal of the application. Sayas v. State, 139 
Idaho 957, 959, 88 P.3d 776, 778 (Ct. App. 2003). 
Equitable tolling would allow a claim to proceed despite being untimely. 
Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 904, 174 P.3d 870, 874 (2007). Equitable tolling 
has only been applied in two situations by Idaho Courts: "where the petitioner 
was incarcerated in an out-of state facility on an in-state conviction without legal 
representation or access to Idaho legal materials and where mental disease 
and/or psychotropic medication renders a petitioner incompetent and prevents 
petitioner from earlier pursuing challenges to his conviction." Id. 





Initially, a petitioner could file a successive post-conviction relief action if 
it is done within one year of the finality of the previous post-conviction relief 
action that the petitioner alleges was tainted by ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794, 800, 992 P.2d 789, 794 (Ct. App. 1999). The 
reason for this time frame was based, at least in part, on the understanding that 
inmates do not typically have help from counsel to initiate a successive post-
conviction relief action. Id. More recently, the Idaho Supreme Court has 
indicated that the "reasonable time" for filing a successive post-conviction action 
should be addressed on a case-by-case basis and that thirteen months was 
"simply too long a period of time to be reasonable." Charboneau v. State, 144 
Idaho 900,905, 174 P.3d 870,875 (2007). Twelve months may be unreasonable in 
cases where it is clear that the petitioner had sufficient information to file his or 
her post-conviction relief action immediately after the termination of the 
previous post-conviction relief action. Schwartz v. State, 145 Idaho 186, 192, 177 
P.3d 400, 406 (Ct. App. 2008). Dismissal of a successive post-conviction relief 
action is appropriate if the previous post-conviction relief action was untimely 
filed. Id. 





Gerdon' s Amended Successive Petition asserts that his prior post-conviction 
counsel failed or improperly raised the issue of ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel for not filing a motion to suppress regarding improper service of a 
search warrant. However, this issue has previously been raised and ruled upon 
in Gerdon's first petition for post-conviction relief. See James Allen Cerdan v. State 
of Idaho, Dist. Ct., Fifth Jud. Dist., Twin Falls County, Idaho, Case No. CV 2004-
5173 (the relevant portion of that opinion is attached to this court's Notice of 
Intent to Dismiss, filed May 17, 2011). Gerdon argues that his counsel during his 
first petition for post-conviction relief was ineffective. However, that claim does 
not entitle Gerdon to relief because it was not raised within reasonable time. 
Gerdon's first post-conviction relief action was dismissed on June 28, 2006. 
A month later, Gerdon expressed concern about the status of his case and Judge 
Hohnhorst mailed a copy of the June 28, 2006 Memorandum Opinion to Gerdon. 
Gerdon sent a letter, postmarked August 15, 2006, requesting an affidavit from 
Judge Hohnhorst for purposes of an appeal. Gerdon then filed an appeal on 
September 10, 2007. The appeal was dismissed for failure to file within forty-two 
days. Gerdon then filed his second post-conviction relief action on April 21, 2008. 
This petition was summarily dismissed on May 6, 2009. Gerdon appealed the 
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dismissal, but filed a Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss Appeal on March 31, 2010. On 
June 21, 2010, Gerdon filed this, his third, post-conviction relief action. 
Gerdon' s first post-conviction was dismissed on June 28, 2006. While it is 
unclear if Gerdon received immediate notification of that decision, Gerdon had 
notice of that decision by August 15, 2006, as evidenced by Judge Hohnhorst's 
letter. Although Gerdon did file an appeal on his first post-conviction relief 
action on September 10, 2007, that appeal was untimely and an untimely appeal 
does not restart the time limitations for subsequent post-conviction relief actions. 
Loman, 138 Idaho at 2, 56 P.3d at 159. As of August 15, 2006, the forty-two days 
for appeal had passed and therefore, Gerdon needed to file a successive post-
conviction action within a reasonable time. Gerdon filed his second post-
conviction relief action on April 21, 2008, more than twenty months after the 
August 15, 2006 date. This second post-conviction relief petition did not discuss 
discovery of new evidence or any other information that Gerdon would not have 
had at the outset of his first post-conviction relief action, except for the ineffective 
assistance of counsel alleged against his post-conviction attorney. 
Equitable tolling on the basis of mental disease or mental incompetence is 
inapplicable becaµse Gerdon does not allege either. Gerdon does contend that he 
is entitled to tolling because he was incarcerated out-of-state. While Gerdon was 
apparently incarcerated out of state, he was not deprived access to the courts. 
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This conclusion is evidenced by Gerdon's knowledge and actions. First, Gerdon 
sent multiple letters to the court from Texas. Second, Gerdon was familiar with 
the process of filing post-conviction relief actions as he had previously filed two 
by himself-one concerning the same underlying criminal conviction as the 
present claim, and another concerning a prior conviction (Twin Falls County CV 
2004--5653). Third, Gerdon's untimely prose appeal for his first post-conviction 
relief action, which was filed from Texas more than seven months before his 
second post-conviction relief action, cites various Idaho appellate rules as well as 
one Idaho case which indicate he had some access to Idaho law materials. 
Fourth, Gerdon was aware, in August 2006, of the essential pieces of information 
necessary to file a successive post-conviction such as his case number, the 
pertinent facts relevant to his case, and his potential claims.1 Thus, he had 
"adequate information to file an application for post-conviction relief." Schwartz, 
145 Idaho at 192, 177 P.3d at 406. 
Lastly, considering Gerdon alleges that he was denied access to the courts 
by being incarcerated out of state and his second post-conviction action was filed 
while he was still in Texas, Gerdon does not assert a significant change in 
circumstances that would enlighten the court as to why Gerdon was denied 
access to the courts in August 2006, but then regained that access in April 2008, 
1 Gerdon claimed that he was entitled to a subsequent post-conviction action because his attorney did not 
present Gerdon's arguments the way Gerdon wanted during his first post-conviction. Such information 
would have been known to Gerdon during that post-conviction action. 
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while still being incarcerated out-of-state (Texas). Simply put, Gerdon was not 
deprived of court access, being very familiar with the process of filing post-
conviction relief claims, and was well aware of the arguments he wanted to 
assert in a subsequent post-conviction relief action when his first post-conviction 
relief action was dismissed. Therefore, Gerdon' s eighteen month delay in filing a 
subsequent post-conviction relief action is unreasonable. 
Based on the untimeliness of Gerdon' s second post-conviction relief 
action, his third post-conviction relief action is also untimely, and must be 
dismissed, regardless of the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel for his first 
post-conviction relief claim. See Schwartz, 145 Idaho at 191, 177 P.3d at 405 
(holding that dismissing a successive post-conviction relief action is appropriate 
if the previous post-conviction relief action was untimely filed); see also Loman v. 
State, 138 Idaho 1, 2, 56 P.3d 158, 159 (Ct. App. 2002) (holding that an untimely 
filing does not reset the clock for subsequent post-conviction relief actions). 




For the reasons set forth above, the court DENIES Petitioner's Motion for 
Reconsideration and Amended Motion for Reconsideration. The court thus 
DISMISSES Petitioner's Amended Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. 
Counsel for the State is ORDERED to prepare a judgment in conformity with this 
opinion within seven (7) days. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
-t4-
Dated this .J!. day of September, 2011. 
District Judge 
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